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Objectives. Schizophrenia is characterised by impaired social interactions and altered trust. 
In the general population, trust is often based on facial appearance, with limited validity but 
enormous social consequences. The aim was to examine trust processing in schizophrenia, 
and specifically to examine how people with schizophrenia use facial appearance as well as 
actual partner fairness to guide trusting decisions. 
Design. An experimental economic game study.  
Methods. Here we tested how schizophrenia patients and control participants (each N = 24) 
use facial trustworthiness appearance and partner fairness behaviour to guide decisions in a 
multi-round Trust Game. In the Trust Game, participants lent money to ‘partners’ whose 
facial appearance was either untrustworthy or trustworthy, and who either played fairly or 
unfairly. Clinical symptoms were measured as well as explicit trustworthiness impressions. 
Results. Overall, the schizophrenia patients showed unimpaired explicit facial 
trustworthiness impressions and unimpaired facial appearance biases in the Trust Game. 
Crucially, patients and controls significantly differed so that the schizophrenia patients did 
not learn to discriminate in the Trust Game based on actual partner fairness, unlike control 
participants. 
Conclusion. A failure to discriminate trust has important implications for everyday 
functioning in schizophrenia, as forming accurate trustworthiness beliefs is an essential social 
skill. Critically, without relying on more valid trust cues, people with schizophrenia may be 
especially susceptible to the misleading effect of appearance when making trusting decisions. 






• People with schizophrenia made very similar facial trustworthiness impressions to 
healthy controls and also used facial appearance to guide trust decisions similarly to 
controls. 
• However, the patient group were less able to explicitly distinguish between fair and 
unfair partners based on their behaviour compared to the control group. 
• Moreover, people with schizophrenia failed to use actual partner fairness to guide their 
financial decisions in the Trust Game, unlike controls, and this impairment was specific 
to a social task.  
• People with schizophrenia may be particularly reliant on facial appearance when 
trusting others, as they may struggle to incorporate more valid trustworthiness 
information in their decision making, such as actual partner fairness. 
  
 4 
Appearance-based trust processing in schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia is characterised by impaired social interactions and altered trust (Brüne 
& Wischniewski, 2011; Freeman, 2007), particularly for patients with paranoia (Gromann et 
al., 2013). These differences manifest early, are particularly resistant to intervention and are 
especially predictive of everyday functioning (Chan & Chen, 2011; Green, Horan, & Lee, 
2015). Moreover, the association between trust and patient symptomology is not always 
straightforward, requiring further investigation (McIntosh & Park, 2014; Prevost, Brodeur, 
Onishi, Lepage, & Gold, 2015). Investigating trust impairment in schizophrenia is therefore 
vital to both understanding and treatment of the disorder. 
A new approach to investigating trust in schizophrenia is to employ economic games, 
which operationalise trust through interactive financial lending (Brüne & Wischniewski, 
2011; Chan & Chen, 2011). Although underutilised in psychiatry research, economic games 
have the benefit of measuring trust unobtrusively, are engaging, and have real-life 
applicability. Moreover, these games may be especially sensitive to social impairment as they 
are interactive and occur in real time (Chan & Chen, 2011; Fett et al., 2012). 
In economic game studies, individuals with schizophrenia or high schizotypy often 
show increased mistrust, indicated by lower financial lending (Fett et al., 2012, 2016; 
Gromann et al., 2013), although not always (van’t Wout & Sanfey, 2011), and sometimes 
patients are hyper-fair (Agay, Kron, Carmel, Mendlovic, & Levkowitz, 2008; Wischniewski 
& Brüne, 2011). More recently, two studies have examined trust over repeated interactions, 
finding that individuals with schizophrenia fail to learn partner trustworthiness (Fett et al., 
2012, 2016). 
However, these economic game studies have largely focused on explicit, top-down 
cues to trustworthiness, such as partner behaviour or reputational information (e.g. Fett et al., 
2012). In doing so, studies have neglected bottom-up, implicit trust cues, like partner facial 
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appearance. Trust behaviour based on facial appearance is widespread in the general 
population (Olivola, Funk, & Todorov, 2014), although facial appearance is not a highly 
accurate trustworthiness cue (Rule, Krendl, Ivcevic, & Ambady, 2013). Trustworthy-looking 
partners are given more money than untrustworthy-looking partners on real financial websites 
(Duarte, Siegel, & Young, 2012) and in lab-based trust games (Chang, Doll, van’t Wout, 
Frank, & Sanfey, 2010; Ewing, Caulfield, Read, & Rhodes, 2015). It is unclear if people with 
schizophrenia similarly use facial appearance to guide their trust decisions. 
 
Current study 
The overall aim was to examine trust processing in schizophrenia, and specifically to 
examine how people with schizophrenia use facial appearance and actual fairness to guide 
trusting decisions. We measured trusting behaviour using an economic Trust Game where 
decisions could be based on partner facial appearance and/or behaviour. In the Trust Game 
(based on Chang et al., 2010; Ewing et al., 2015), trusting decisions were indexed by money 
transferred to four ‘partners’, who looked untrustworthy or trustworthy, and played fairly 
(returned an equal share of invested money) or unfairly (kept all the money). Participants 
played multiple rounds of the Trust Game with the same partners. This design allowed us to 
investigate whether people with schizophrenia differed from controls in their reliance on 
facial appearance as well as actual partner fairness in guiding trust. 
Regarding appearance-based trust, social behaviour in schizophrenia and autism is 
often similar (Frith & Johnstone, 2003), and autistic boys are less guided by facial 
appearance in trust games than non-autistic boys (Ewing et al., 2015). Following the pattern 
in autism, we would predict that people with schizophrenia are less guided by appearance 
than controls. Yet, to the extent that people with schizophrenia may form more extreme 
impressions from facial appearance than controls (Trémeau et al., 2016), this account would 
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instead predict that people with schizophrenia are relatively more guided by appearance. We 
tested these opposing hypotheses here. We also tested explicit trustworthiness impressions 
based on facial appearance, to inform the Trust Game results. We did not have a strong 
prediction for explicit facial impressions as evidence is mixed (Hall et al., 2004, 2010; Haut 
& MacDonald III, 2010; Marwick & Hall, 2008; McIntosh & Park, 2014; van’t Wout et al., 
2007). 
Regarding experience-based trust, we predicted that the participants with 
schizophrenia would be less influenced than controls by partner actual fairness when making 
trusting decisions (following Fett et al., 2012, 2016). Capacity to learn partner fairness is 
likely underpinned by ability to utilise experience when reasoning, and theory of mind 
(ToM), skills that are impaired in schizophrenia (Langdon, 2005; Woodward, Moritz, Cuttler, 
& Whitman, 2006). As a supplementary analysis (see supporting information), we therefore 
measured cognitive reasoning (Moritz & Woodward, 2005; Woodward et al., 2006) and ToM 
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Langdon, 2005) to ascertain any 
links between these capacities and trust behaviour. Finally, we included a version of the Trust 
Game with slot machines rather than partners, to control for non-social aspects of gameplay 





We recruited 24 individuals with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder from 
volunteer registers in the [blinded for review]. We recruited 24 healthy controls from the 
general community. Exclusion criteria for all participants included history of brain injury or 
other neurological disorder, or current or previous persistent substance abuse. Controls with a 
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personal or familial history of psychotic disorder were also excluded. Clinical participants 
had a DSM5 diagnosis of schizophrenia (N = 17) or schizoaffective disorder (N = 7) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Diagnosis was confirmed using the Diagnostic 
Interview for Psychosis (Castle, Jablensky, & McGrath, 2006) and clinical history. Current 
symptoms were rated using the Scales for Assessing Positive and Negative Symptoms of 
Schizophrenia (SAPS/SANS: Andreasen, 1983, 1984). Thirteen clinical participants had 
current delusions and eleven did not. We also measured general proneness to delusional 
ideation using the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI, Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 
2004), and recorded the persecution subscore (Verdoux et al., 1998) given the relevance of 
paranoia for trust (Freeman, 2007). All clinical participants were on medication at the time of 
testing. Of the 24 clinical participants taking antipsychotic medication, two were taking 
typical antipsychotic medication only, 20 were taking atypical antipsychotic medication only, 
and two were taking a combination of typical and atypical medications. Additionally, 14 
clinical participants were also taking an antidepressant. 
Clinical and control groups did not differ in premorbid intelligence (on the National 
Adult Reading Test: NART), current intelligence (on the Matrix Reasoning component of the 
Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale) or age at testing (Table 1). Participants gave written 
informed consent to procedures approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of 
[blinded for review]. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Tasks 
Facial impressions: Participants rated the trustworthiness of 40 faces in a pseudo-
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randomised order1 (after two practice images) using a 9-point scale (1 = not at all 
trustworthy, 9 = very trustworthy). We measured mean trustworthiness impressions and 
agreement with consensus trustworthiness impressions (from Hooper et al., 2018). Face 
images were taken from the US10K (Bainbridge, Isola, & Oliva, 2013) and restricted to 
Caucasian females to avoid stereotyping (Hooper et al., 2018). 
Trust Game: Participants played a multi-turn Trust Game previously used with 
students (Hooper et al., 2018; see Figure 1). After two practice trials with cartoon partners, 
participants played eight turns with four virtual ‘partners’ (32 trials). On each turn, 
participants received $10 of virtual money, then viewed their partner’s face for 3.5s and were 
required to invest between $0 and $10 with their partner. Any investment was quadrupled. 
Partners returned an equal split of the money (fair behaviour) or kept the money (unfair 
behaviour). Thus, if the partner was fair, the participant doubled their investment, and if 
unfair, the participant lost their investment. Participants additionally kept any amount not 
invested. If participants took longer than 8s to make an offer, they forfeited all their money 
on that turn (seven and eight turns across both games for clinical and control participants 
respectively). These trials were treated as missing data to ensure money transferred was not 
confounded by impulsivity. 
Participants viewed one of two possible sets of partners, which were counterbalanced 
across participants. Partners were Caucasian females only, to avoid stereotyping, and were 
taken from the US10K (Bainbridge et al., 2013). Two partners were trustworthy-looking and 
two were untrustworthy-looking (Hooper et al., 2018). 
Assignment of partner behaviour was crossed with facial appearance and 
counterbalanced across participants. Fair partners returned money to participants on 7/8 
                                                     
1 Due to experimenter error, two patients and two controls were shown the images in a different order. 
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turns; unfair partners returned money on 1/8 turns. Behaviour was probabilistic to prevent the 
game from being too easy and to better replicate real-world interaction (Chang et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Slot Machine game: We included a non-social version of the Trust Game, which was 
identical except that participants played with four coloured slot machines. Including this 
game allowed us to control for task-specific aspects of the Trust Game (e.g. reward 
sensitivity). 
Explicit beliefs: At the end of the Trust Game and Slot Machine tasks, we examined 
participants’ beliefs about how trustworthy their partners looked, as well as how fairly the 
partners or slot machines behaved. Participants were asked to rate each partner’s face on their 
trustworthiness levels between 1 and 10 (1 = not at all trustworthy and 10 = extremely 
trustworthy). They were also required to rate partners or slot machines on their fairness 
levels, defined as the percentage of times their partner or the slot machine returned money (0 
= 0% to 9 = 90% in 10% increments). 
Additional measures: we also measured cognitive biases and theory of mind (see 
supporting information for more details). 
 
General Procedure 
Computer-based tasks were performed on a Dell PC running Windows 7. The facial 
trustworthiness task was completed after the trust games to avoid priming participants. No 





 We first tested for a clinical difference in explicit trustworthiness facial impressions 
by correlating each of the clinical and control groups’ impressions with independent 
consensus impressions. We statistically compared the clinical and control groups’ 
correlations using a Fisher z test.  
In order to understand if there was a clinical difference in trusting decisions based on 
partners’ appearance and/or actual fairness over time, we then analysed trusting decisions in 
the trust game (money transferred) with a four-way mixed ANOVA. The ANOVA had Group 
(clinical or control) as a between-subjects factor, and Partner Appearance (trustworthy or 
untrustworthy), Partner Behaviour (fair or unfair) and Time (first or last block) as within-
subjects factors. The four-way interaction was not significant, thus we ran a three-way 
ANOVA for Group, Appearance, and Time after collapsing over Behaviour to examine the 
effect of Appearance. We then ran a three-way ANOVA for Group, Behaviour, and Time 
after collapsing over Appearance to examine the effect of Behaviour. We ran an identical 
ANOVA for the control Slot Machine task, but without the Appearance factor. 
Finally, in order to understand if there was a clinical difference in explicit appearance 
and fairness beliefs, we ran two-way mixed ANOVAs on the explicit appearance and fairness 
ratings of the partners in the Trust and Slot Machine Games. These ANOVAs had Group 
(clinical or control) as a between-subjects factor and either Partner Appearance (trustworthy 
or untrustworthy) or Partner or Slot Machine Behaviour (fair or unfair) as within-subjects 
factors. 
Across all analyses, we followed up any significant effects for Appearance or 
Behaviour using paired t-tests to compare trustworthy-looking versus untrustworthy-looking 
partners or fair versus unfair partners respectively. Where the clinical Group factor interacted 
with Appearance or Behaviour conditions, we ran separate paired t-tests for clinical and 
control groups separately in order to understand the pattern for each group. Where the Time 
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factor interacted, we ran separate paired t-tests for first and last blocks separately in order to 
understand the pattern at each time point. 
Results 
Explicit Facial Trustworthiness Impressions 
We first examined how people with schizophrenia made explicit trust impressions 
from faces, in order to contextualise the Trust Game results. 
Main facial impressions task: One participant in each group was excluded from the 
facial impressions agreement analysis because they failed to discriminate between the faces. 
Both groups showed significant agreement with consensus facial trustworthiness judgements: 
clinical mean r = .31, SD r = .20, t(22) = 7.06, p < .001, control mean r = .27, SD r = .16, 
t(22) = 7.72, p < .001, with no significant group difference; t(44) = 0.96, p = .343, d = 0.28 
(all correlations reflect Pearson’s r; t-test after Fisher-transformation). We also did not find a 
difference in mean impressions: clinical mean = 5.31, SD = 1.12; control mean = 5.03, SD = 
0.90; t(46) = -0.97, p = .336, d = 0.28 or in impression variance, t(46) = 0.48, p = 0.492. All d 
values (here and elsewhere) reflect Cohen’s d for the group difference. 
Facial impressions of Trust Game partners: As a manipulation check, participants 
rated the facial trustworthiness of their partners after the Trust Game. We analysed these 
explicit impressions in a two-way mixed ANOVA with Group (clinical versus control) as a 
between-subjects factor and Partner Appearance (Trustworthy versus Untrustworthy) as a 
within-subjects factor. The main effect of Appearance was significant, indicating that 
participants perceived the trustworthy-looking partners as more trustworthy (M = 4.8, SD = 
2.1) than the untrustworthy-looking partners (M = 3.5, SD = 1.6), as expected: F(1,46) = 
20.30, p < .001, ηp2=  0.31). There was no main effect or interaction with Group: both 
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F(1,46) < 0.27, p > .60, ηp2 < 0.01), thus the clinical group did not show lower overall trust, 
agreeing with the main trustworthiness impressions task. 
 
Trust Game Decisions 
Our main aim was to examine how people with schizophrenia use facial appearance 
and/or experience with actual fairness to guide trusting decisions. We conducted a four-way 
mixed ANOVA with Group (clinical versus control) as a between-subjects factor, and Partner 
Appearance (trustworthy versus untrustworthy), Partner Behaviour (fair or unfair) and Time 
(first versus last block) as within-subjects factors. We could compare the first and last block 
directly because these trials were identical. The four-way interaction was not significant: 
F(1,42) = 0.18, p = .37, ηp2 = .02 (note that four participants had to be excluded from this 
overall analysis due to missing trials). As the overall four-way interaction was not significant, 
for simplicity, we examined trust based on appearance and behaviour separately (i.e. after 
collapsing across behaviour/appearance respectively). These analyses allowed us to use the 
whole dataset and paralleled the slot machine game (see the supplementary materials for the 
four-way ANOVA results, which were identical). 
Appearance-based Trust Decisions: To test for a group difference in appearance-
based trust, we conducted a three-way mixed ANOVA on money transferred in the Trust 
Game, with Group (clinical versus control) as a between-subjects factor and Partner 
Appearance (trustworthy versus untrustworthy) and Time (first versus last block) as within-
subjects factors (collapsed across Partner Behaviour). Critically, by the last block in the Trust 
Game, participants should have stopped using facial appearance to guide decision-making, 
given that it did not accurately cue partner fairness. 
Interestingly, the only significant effect was a main effect for Partner Appearance:  
F(1,46) = 7.12, p = .011, ηp2 = 0.13. On average, participants transferred more money to 
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trustworthy-looking (mean = $5.34, SD = $2.17) than untrustworthy-looking partners (mean 
= $4.64, SD = $2.55) in the Trust Game. No other effects were significant: F(1,46) < 1.36, p 
> .25, ηp2 < 0.03 (Figure 2). In other words, misleading facial appearance was used to guide 
decision-making, even when other, more objective information (partner fairness) was 
available. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
 Experience-based Trust Decisions: To test whether the groups learned to 
discriminate partner fairness, we conducted a three-way mixed ANOVA on money 
transferred in the Trust Game, with Group (clinical versus control) as a between-subjects 
factor and Partner Behaviour (fair versus unfair) and Time (first versus last block) as within-
subjects factors (collapsed across Partner Appearance). There was a significant main effect of 
Partner Behaviour: F(1,46) = 19.89, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.30, and two-way interactions between 
Group and Partner Behaviour, as well as Time and Partner Behaviour: both F(1,46) > 8.05, p 
< .007, ηp2 > 0.15 (Figure 3). 
Critically, there was also a significant three-way interaction, suggesting that the 
groups had different responses to partner behaviour over time: F(1,46) = 6.13, p = .017, ηp2 = 
0.12 (Figure 3). We ran paired t-tests to follow up on this interaction. As expected, neither 
the control nor clinical group discriminated based on fair versus unfair partner behaviour in 
the first block, before partner behaviour was known: control t(23) = 1.18, p = .251, d = 0.22, 
clinical: t(23) = 0.51, p = .613, d =  0.09. Strikingly, whereas controls did discriminate based 
on fair versus unfair partner behaviour by the last block: t(23) = 5.81, p < .001, d = 1.47, the 
clinical group did not: t(23) = 1.05, p = .303, d = 0.23. Thus, unlike controls, the patients 
with schizophrenia failed to learn to use partner behaviour to guide their trust decisions. 
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Figure 3 about here 
 
Non-social control task 
The clinical group struggled to discriminate partner actual fairness in the Trust Game, 
raising the question of whether this effect is specific to a social task involving human 
partners, or whether it reflects a more general problem.To answer this question, we examined 
whether the groups learned to discriminate between rewarding and non-rewarding slot 
machines over the course of the Slot Game. Thus, we conducted a three-way mixed ANOVA 
on money transferred, with Group (clinical versus control) as a between-subjects factor and 
Slot Machine (rewarding versus unrewarding) and Time (first versus last block) as within-
subjects factors (Figure 4). There was a significant main effect of Slot Machine: F(1,46) = 
24.55, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.35, reflecting more money transferred to the rewarding slot machine 
(M = $6.44, SD = $2.54) versus the unrewarding slot machine (M = $4.88, SD = $3.09). 
There was also a main effect of Group: F(1,46) = 6.06, p = .018, ηp2 = 0.12, reflecting a 
tendency for the clinical participants to transfer more money on average (M = $6.28, SD = 
$2.95) than controls (M = $5.04, SD = $2.79). There was a significant two-way interaction 
between Slot Machine and Time, reflecting learning which slots were rewarding: F(1,46) = 
20.24, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.31. Importantly, the three-way interaction was not significant, 
F(1,46) = 0.09, p = .771, ηp2 = 0.002. At the start, neither group discriminated between 
rewarding and unrewarding slot machines: both t(23) < 1.03, p > .314, d < 0.12. By the end, 
both groups had learnt to discriminate between rewarding and unrewarding slot machines: 
both t(23) > 3.54, p < .002, d > 0.94 (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
Explicit fairness beliefs 
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Finally, given the suggestion of possible dissociations between explicit and implicit 
social-cognitive processes in schizophrenia (e.g. Frith, 2004), we investigated whether the 
clinical group’s inability to distinguish partner fairness in the Trust Game reflected an 
explicit or implicit problem in distinguishing fairness. To measure their explicit fairness 
beliefs, participants rated the perceived fairness of their partners and slot machines at the end 
of the games. We analysed the Trust Game fairness ratings in a two-way mixed ANOVA 
with Group (clinical versus control) as a between-subjects factor and Partner Behaviour (fair 
versus unfair) as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant main effect of Behaviour, 
thus participants correctly distinguished fair and unfair partners: F(1,46) = 38.10, p < .001, 
ηp2= 0.45; however, this pattern was qualified by a significant interaction with Group: 
F(1,46) = 10.07, p = .003, ηp2= 0.18. Both the clinical and control participants correctly 
judged the fairness of their partners in the Trust Game, although fairness discrimination was 
weaker in the clinical group (fair M = 5.2, SD = 1.7, unfair M = 4.1, SD = 1.7, t(23) = 2.45, p 
< .023, d = 0.64), compared to the control group (fair M = 6.2, SD = 1.5, unfair M = 2.9, SD 
= 1.7, t(23) = 5.91, p < .001, d = 2.09). Thus, the clinical participants were less able to 
explicitly distinguish fair and unfair partners than controls, mirroring the pattern for money 
transferred. The main effect of Group was not significant, thus the clinical and control groups 
did not differ in absolute fairness ratings: F(1,46) = 0.04, p = .842, ηp2 < 0.00. 
In the Slot Game, there was only a significant main effect of Behaviour, F(1,46) = 
46.25, p < .001, ηp2= 0.50, with no other significant effects: both F(1,46) < 0.47, p > .50, ηp2 
< 0.01. Overall, all participants correctly distinguished rewarding (M = 6.0, SD = 1.7) and 
unrewarding slot machines (M = 3.3, SD = 1.7) in their fairness ratings. Thus, as for money 






Overall, individuals with schizophrenia and healthy controls formed very similar 
explicit facial trustworthy impressions. Both groups also relied on facial trustworthy 
appearance to guide financial decisions in the Trust Game. Crucially, however, the 
participants with schizophrenia failed to use actual partner fairness to guide their financial 
decisions in the Trust Game, unlike controls, and this impairment was specific to a social 
task. Moreover, the clinical group were also less able to explicitly distinguish between fair 
and unfair partners based on their behaviour compared to the control group. Our findings 
agree with two recent studies on trust reciprocation, which have also shown impairments in 
trust updating in schizophrenia and psychosis (Fett et al., 2012, 2016). Critically, here we 
also show that people with schizophrenia appear to anchor on an initial, potentially 
misleading trust decision based on appearance, and then, unlike control participants, fail to 
update their strategy to incorporate more valid information about actual partner 
trustworthiness. 
A failure to learn trustworthiness in schizophrenia 
Our Trust Game results are also strikingly similar to cognitive reasoning biases found 
previously in schizophrenia (Moritz & Woodward, 2005; Woodward et al., 2006), suggesting 
that reasoning biases may be contributing to social impairment in this disorder. Our 
distinction between appearance-based and experience-based trust is also consistent with 
recent theories of low- and high-level processes of predictive coding and their potential 
disturbance in psychosis (see Sterzer et al., 2018; Sterzer, Voss, Schlagenhauf, & Heinz, 
2019 for reviews). In predictive coding accounts of schizophrenia, psychosis may reflect a 
problem with weaker prior expectations for lower-level visual input (here, appearance), 
which in turn may cause stronger prior expectations for higher-level beliefs, or conceptual 
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input (here, learning from experience). This account would likely predict less strong visual 
appearance biases, which we did not find (nor did other recent predictive coding studies: 
Kaliuzhna et al., 2018; Palmer, Caruana, Clifford, & Seymour, 2018); nevertheless, it would 
also predict less updating of conceptual beliefs based on actual experience, which is 
consistent with our results. 
The clinical group did not show a failure in experience-based trust for the control 
(non-social) slot machine game. Why not? Certainly, there is a wealth of literature showing 
aberrant non-social reward processing in schizophrenia (see Strauss, Waltz, & Gold, 2014 for 
a review). Some predictive coding accounts argue that social processing may be particularly 
disrupted in psychosis as aberrant predictive coding would make other people’s intentions 
seem unreliable (Sterzer et al., 2018). Given that we can never truly verify another’s 
intentions, social cues may be relatively more uncertain than non-social ones (Sterzer et al., 
2018). Potentially, forming (and overcoming) an initial impression is also critical: in the 
social Trust Game, it is possible to base a decision on the initial and misleading evidence of 
partner facial appearance, in contrast to the slot machine game. Similarly, non-social learning 
studies have found that habitual decision-making is less disrupted in schizophrenia than 
flexible decision-making (Culbreth, Westbrook, Daw, Botvinick, & Barch, 2016; Strauss et 
al., 2014). Finally, it is also possible that the slot machine game may simply have been easier 
or influenced by practice, given that it was presented after the Trust Game to avoid 
influencing performance on our measure of key interest. Future research should tease apart 
these explanations, because successful learning in the slot machine game could provide a 
useful therapeutic tool if it is indeed easier and training generalises. 
Interestingly, there was no evidence of overall higher suspiciousness for the clinical 
group in the Trust Game. The clinical group transferred as much money as did controls and 
rated their partners equally in fairness. Previous studies measuring gameplay in schizophrenia 
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and psychosis have been mixed (Agay et al., 2008; Fett et al., 2012; Gromann et al., 2013; 
van’t Wout & Sanfey, 2011; Wischniewski & Brüne, 2011). Overall, previous studies are 
heterogeneous in both patient symptoms and gameplay, including incentive structure and live 
versus pre-programmed gameplay. For this reason, we deliberately chose a game design 
which has been used in previous work with neurotypical adults (Chang et al., 2010; Hooper et 
al., 2018). However, future research should systematically test these factors and could also 
use more complex and/or naturalistic trust game designs.  
Unimpaired trustworthiness appearance processing in schizophrenia 
The group with schizophrenia made very similar explicit facial impressions to healthy 
participants and also used facial appearance to guide trust decisions. The finding of 
unimpaired facial trustworthiness impressions contradicts some previous studies (Hall et al., 
2004; Haut & MacDonald III, 2010; Pinkham, Hopfinger, Pelphrey, Piven, & Penn, 2008; 
Trémeau et al., 2016) but agrees with others (Marwick & Hall, 2008; McIntosh & Park, 2014; 
Mukherjee et al., 2014). Our study used naturalistic face images, which have greater 
ecological validity and likely preserve more trustworthiness cues relative to lab-based images 
used in some studies (e.g. Pinkham et al., 2008). Moreover, even studies that find clinical 
impairments observe stronger differences for judgements other than trust (e.g., intelligence: 
Hall et al., 2004), suggesting that any such differences are not specific to trust per se. 
Interestingly, the pattern here also contrasts with the pattern found in autism (Ewing et al., 
2015) and for men with high autistic traits (Hooper et al., 2018), who showed less 
appearance-based trust decisions but similar experience-based trust compared to controls, 
suggesting important social processing differences between schizophrenia and autism. 
Future research 
Future research should test whether the interpersonal trust issues found here are also 
present at other stages of illness (e.g., early psychosis) and in other clinical samples (e.g., 
 19 
more functionally impaired groups). Effects on everyday social functioning and implications 
for treatment likewise warrant further research. A promising future direction will be to 
establish whether training on economic games can improve everyday social interaction 
problems in schizophrenia (Chan & Chen, 2011). Anecdotally, these games show promise as 
a therapeutic tool, as the participants with schizophrenia reported enjoying the tasks, which 
did not take long (15 mins). 
Conclusions 
Facial appearance guides trust across a wide variety of social contexts, although it is often 
misleading (Olivola et al., 2014). Critically, people with schizophrenia may be particularly 
subject to the misleading effect of appearance when making everyday trusting decisions, as 
they may struggle to incorporate more valid information in their decision-making, such as the 
actual fairness of their social partners. 
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Figure 1. Example of a single Trust Game turn. Note. Instead of transferring money, 
participants could also choose to transfer no money by pressing a key labelled “no money”. 
The face shown in the game here is an example due to copyright reasons and was not one of 
the faces used in the Trust Game, although it is representative. Figure previously published in 









Figure 2. Trust Game and partner appearance. Money transferred in the Trust Game on 
average for A) control (left hand panel) and B) clinical participants (right hand panel), based 
on partner trustworthy (light grey) or untrustworthy (dark grey) appearance in the first and 
last blocks of the Trust Game. Figures depict boxplots with the mean superimposed. The only 
significant effect was of partner appearance, so that more money was transferred to 






Figure 3. Trust Game and partner fairness. Money transferred in the Trust Game on 
average for A) control (left hand panel) and B) clinical participants (right hand panel), based 
on fair (light grey) or unfair (dark grey) partner behaviour in the first and last blocks of the 
Trust Game. Figures are boxplots with the mean superimposed. In the first block, participants 
have not experienced the unfair or fair behaviour of their partners, thus neither control nor 
clinical participants discriminate based on partner behaviour. By the last block, control 
participants have successfully learnt which partners are trustworthy, as they discriminate 
based on fair or unfair partner behaviour. Crucially, participants with schizophrenia fail to 






Figure 4. Slot machine game. Money transferred in the Slot Machine Game on average for 
A) control (left hand panel) and B) clinical participants (right hand panel), based on fair (light 
grey) or unfair (dark grey) partner behaviour in the first and last blocks of the Slot Machine 
Game. Figures are boxplots with the mean superimposed. In the first block, participants have 
not experienced the unfair or fair behaviour of their partners, thus neither control nor clinical 
participants discriminate based on partner behaviour. By the last block, clinical and control 






Mean and SD for demographic and IQ variables for clinical and control groups, and clinical 







N 24 24 - 
Males:females 14:10 14:10 - 
Age at testing (years) 51.9 (8.9)  45.6 (13.8) t(39.4) = 1.88, p = .068, d = 0.5 
NART full score 108.0 (9.7) 106.5 (10.1) t(46) = 0.51, p = .612, d = 0.2 
WASI matrix reasoning (raw score) 17.6 (4.3) 19.7 (4.8) t(46) = 1.60, p = .116, d = 0.5 
WASI matrix reasoning (scaled score) 9.3 (3.3) 10.6 (3.2) t(46) = 1.36, p = .179, d = 0.4 
Age at diagnosis (years) 25.7 (9.1) - - 
SAPS global (mean) 1.2 (0.7) - - 
SANS global (mean) 2.4 (0.6) - - 
PDI score (sum of paranoia items: Q1, 
Q3-5) 
2.5 (1.3) - - 
 
 
